Romania is a nation with a turbulent past and the faint light of hope for a promising future, where the disparate ideologies of East and West collide, and traditional values intersect with elements of progressive reform. It is a nation cursed with the geographic misfortune of being situated squarely at the crossroads of ancient empires, and as such, Romania has been taken over by virtually every army that has ever crossed its borders, from the Romans to the Austrians to the Turks, to name a few. Paradoxically, this underlying political instability has cultivated a strong attachment to the traditions that define Romanian cultural identity, which in turn, has helped foster a deeply engrained sense of nationalism that has been repeatedly exploited by those in power.
This state-imposed ethnocentricity has made Romania into a cultural "island" of sorts for most of the twentieth century, isolated from not only the immediate influence of the West, but also from many of its neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that linguistically, aside from Moldova (which was formerly a part of Romania), this is the only nation in a predominantly Slavic region in which Romanian, the least common of the Romance languages, bearing more similarities to Vulgar Latin than any other modern language, is officially spoken. With these factors in mind, much like the Galapagos Islands were to biologists in the early nineteenth century, scholars of mass media and cultural anthropology can learn a great deal from this nation in terms of how media discourse in the public sphere has evolved in Romania relative to its contemporaries in the industrialized world.
This state-imposed ethnocentricity has made Romania into a cultural "island" of sorts for most of the twentieth century, isolated from not only the immediate influence of the West, but also from many of its neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that linguistically, aside from Moldova (which was formerly a part of Romania), this is the only nation in a predominantly Slavic region in which Romanian, the least common of the Romance languages, bearing more similarities to Vulgar Latin than any other modern language, is officially spoken. With these factors in mind, much like the Galapagos Islands were to biologists in the early nineteenth century, scholars of mass media and cultural anthropology can learn a great deal from this nation in terms of how media discourse in the public sphere has evolved in Romania relative to its contemporaries in the industrialized world.
The first Romanian-language newspaper, Curierul Bucurescilor, was published in Bucharest and Iasi in 1829, and for its first few decades, the Romanian press "articulated nationalist sentiments, informed its readers, gave journalistic life to the Romanian language and literature and served as a catalyst and mobilizer for national unification" (Gross, 4). Even from the very start, Romanian media was highly politicized and unapologetically opinionated, subscribing to specific ideologies without offering an outlet for dissent. The one nationally circulated newspaper in Romania in the mid-nineteenth century was merely a vehicle for the indoctrination of the people by those in power, and it was loaded with political rhetoric designed to unite the working class behind the precept of nationalism so that they might serve the will of the ruling oligarchy. Unfortunately, over the next hundred and eighty years, as I will explain, very little has changed in this regard.
In 1862, the first Romanian media laws were introduced, which were supposed to guarantee freedom of the press without interference by the state. In spite of these laws, newspapers were often censored or even suspended by the conservative majority of the Romanian government. In some cases, editors and journalists were imprisoned or forced into exile for publishing stories that displeased the authorities (Coman and Gross, 12). In this sense, one could argue that throughout the nineteenth century, the Romanian people had never truly been given a voice in the media, nor had they been adequately informed of the happenings within their borders and beyond that held the potential to impact their lives on a daily basis. This shroud of ignorance has historically been the means by which those in power have remained in power, and as such, the Romanian people have never been citizens so much as subjects, condemned by the will of their oppressors.
From the mid-nineteenth century to the first quarter of the twentieth century, Romanian media almost exclusively served the limited interests of politicos and entrepreneurs with strong ties to the ruling government. At the onset of the First World War, Romania had wished to remain neutral, but hostile German forces led the Romanian army to join the Allied Powers, primarily because they were in desperate need of foreign military assistance. Nonetheless, the Romanian press was highly propagandized by the occupying German army in an effort to gain support for the Kaiser's war effort. When the Central Powers were finally defeated and the Romanian borders were expanded to include Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia, new anti-censorship laws were put into place in Greater Romania but never fully institutionalized. As we will see, this is a common theme in the history of Romanian media.
Although the national press did see some improvement in its freedom of expression with the ratification of the 1923 Constitution, this brief period of semi-professionalism came to an immediate halt with the establishment of a pro-Nazi, neo-fascist dictatorship in 1938. This led to the governmental ban of newspapers that were deemed "unfriendly" by those in power and the re-establishment of the Office of Press and Propaganda that had first been put into place by German forces during World War I. During the Second World War, once again, Romania initially attempted to remain neutral, but this time, they soon joined the Axis Powers at the will of General Ion Antonescu, who had forced Carol II, Romania's reigning king, to abdicate the throne and leave the country against his will. However, in 1944, when the formidable Red Army advanced on the Romanian front, Antonescu was turned over to the Russians and promptly executed. Shortly thereafter, as the war drew to a close, Romania fell under the shadow of communist rule (Coman and Gross, 15-16).
Although the national press did see some improvement in its freedom of expression with the ratification of the 1923 Constitution, this brief period of semi-professionalism came to an immediate halt with the establishment of a pro-Nazi, neo-fascist dictatorship in 1938. This led to the governmental ban of newspapers that were deemed "unfriendly" by those in power and the re-establishment of the Office of Press and Propaganda that had first been put into place by German forces during World War I. During the Second World War, once again, Romania initially attempted to remain neutral, but this time, they soon joined the Axis Powers at the will of General Ion Antonescu, who had forced Carol II, Romania's reigning king, to abdicate the throne and leave the country against his will. However, in 1944, when the formidable Red Army advanced on the Romanian front, Antonescu was turned over to the Russians and promptly executed. Shortly thereafter, as the war drew to a close, Romania fell under the shadow of communist rule (Coman and Gross, 15-16).
Social historian Peter Gross suggests that there were essentially four stages of communist control over mass media in Romania. The first stage, which lasted from 1947 to 1965, he describes as, "Closure of the old and attempts at stabilizing the newly established communist regime" (Gross, 4). During this period, trade agreements were set up with the Soviet Union that robbed Romania of its natural resources and blatantly exploited its workers, and the fundamental role of the media at the time was to garner unquestioning support of these policies by appealing to the Romanian people's sense of nationalism. Through the media, the government made bold attempts at creating the "new socialist man" (Coman and Gross, 18). Meanwhile, the newly established secret police force, the Securitate, took a more hands-on approach to intimidating the Romanian people into submission. Even after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, as Nikita Khrushchev brought about a different style of leadership to the Soviet Union, Romanian policies nonetheless became increasingly Stalinesque.
This is particularly true of those imposed by Nicolae Ceauşescu, the despotic ruler who gave a public identity to Romanian totalitarianism in 1965, thus marking the beginning of what Gross describes as the second stage of communist control, which he claims lasted until 1971. During this time, Romania experienced "attempts at softening the face of communism, and a degree of openness to some Western media, books, and the like" (Gross, 4). Again, by appealing to the Romanian people to do what is best for their country, under the guise of socialism, an increasingly fascist state began to take shape. Although Romanian media laws were in fact somewhat relaxed during this period, the only form of dissent allowed by the state was that which was directed toward the Soviet Union, from whom the Romanian government was indeed trying to distance itself.
According to Gross, the third stage of communist control in Romania began in 1971 and lasted until 1978. As he explains, "By the time Ceauşescu returned from his visit to China and North Korea in 1971, the mask of liberalization began to fall off, and the Romanian version of China's cultural revolution was launched alongside a fast-growing personality cult" (Gross, 9). Ceauşescu's new directives called for "stronger revolutionary propaganda in all reaches of society, especially in schools and the entertainment and cultural world" (Gross, 10).
Around this time, Romanian money, the leu, was made nonconvertible to foreign currency and the borders were officially closed not only to people who were traveling in or out of the country, but also to any and all Western books, movies and music. Romanians faced the distinct possibility of being imprisoned in extremely harsh conditions for so much as possessing such contraband. Even typewriters could only be distributed by the government, and their ink ribbons were subject to inspection by the Securitate (Gross, 25).
Furthermore, all telecommunications to the outside world as well as many phone calls within Romania were monitored by the Securitate; and although Romanians were technically allowed to apply for exit visas, this was a process that usually took about four years, during which time their livelihood was completely destroyed by the Securitate. This served as a nearly fail-safe deterrent to defection. Ceauşescu wanted absolute independence from all foreign influences, which he claimed was what was best for the Romanian people, and he achieved this by instituting Orwellian policies upon them. "It was not just words such as democracy, progress, justice, socialism, the people, and truth that took on meanings of their own, devoid of reality. The value attached to other words, sentences and whole works took on the kind of unreal or duplicitous meanings that permeated all human relations" (Gross, 23-24).
Around this time, Romanian money, the leu, was made nonconvertible to foreign currency and the borders were officially closed not only to people who were traveling in or out of the country, but also to any and all Western books, movies and music. Romanians faced the distinct possibility of being imprisoned in extremely harsh conditions for so much as possessing such contraband. Even typewriters could only be distributed by the government, and their ink ribbons were subject to inspection by the Securitate (Gross, 25).
Furthermore, all telecommunications to the outside world as well as many phone calls within Romania were monitored by the Securitate; and although Romanians were technically allowed to apply for exit visas, this was a process that usually took about four years, during which time their livelihood was completely destroyed by the Securitate. This served as a nearly fail-safe deterrent to defection. Ceauşescu wanted absolute independence from all foreign influences, which he claimed was what was best for the Romanian people, and he achieved this by instituting Orwellian policies upon them. "It was not just words such as democracy, progress, justice, socialism, the people, and truth that took on meanings of their own, devoid of reality. The value attached to other words, sentences and whole works took on the kind of unreal or duplicitous meanings that permeated all human relations" (Gross, 23-24).
At the time, a common Romanian joke went something like this:
- What do you think about Scinteia?
- It's an excellent newspaper.
- And Romania Libera?
- Very good, too.
- What about Lumea?
- Oh, that one isn't any good. Its paper is too thick. It clogs the toilet.
(Coman and Gross, 24)
The majority of the Romanian people knew well enough not take the media seriously, particularly during what Gross describes as the fourth and final stage of communist control, which included the years from 1978 through the fall of Ceauşescu in December 1989. During this period, Romanian radio, television and film were more heavily censored than ever before and were used to promote extreme nationalism to the point of absurdity and to foster a cult of personality around Ceauşescu. More than ever, he insisted that Romanian journalists be "communist fighters" and "party activists" (Berry, 17). According to social theorist David Berry:
All ideology was effectively filtered through press and television, but it was in the latter that the state managed to create a fantastical image of society. Television was a medium that produced and 'stage-managed' one of the greatest and most grotesque spectacles of theatre and it projected a carnivalesque atmosphere of happiness, gaiety, collective fulfillment and participation in the creation of Ceauşescu's image of the socialist man" (18).
By 1989, there were thirty-six state-controlled newspapers operating in Romania, as well as nine radio stations and one television channel that broadcast only three hours per day, supposedly because Ceauşescu "did not want to tire the population" by having them stay up late watching television. Because of the theatrical absurdity of the meta-reality presented in the media, in the late 1980s, it is estimated that only twenty-two percent of the population watched Romanian TV and only forty-three percent read Romanian newspapers. However, approximately sixty-nine percent of all Romanians listened to the radio, which Ceauşescu had foolishly deemed to be "not as important" as these other forms of media. (Gross, 13). In actuality, though, in December 1989, the radio became an important tool that helped incite a national revolution.
In the westernmost city of Timisoara, Romanians heard news reports on Hungarian radio, which was broadcast from just across the border, that Reverend Laszlo Tokes of the Reformed Church had been evicted from his place of worship for speaking out against the Romanian authorities in his sermons. This brought several hundred people to his church to support him in protest. By December 15, that number had grown to over a thousand, and the conflict between them and the Securitate quickly turned violent. Over the next two days, what began as a revolt marked the beginning of an all-out revolution. Meanwhile, the Romanian media remained silent about the events that were taking place in Timisoara, just as news anchors had not informed the Romanian people of the student uprising at Tiananmen Square or the events that had taken place in several of the other recently fallen communist states in the region.
By December 18, Timisoara's main post office was officially closed and all telephone links to the outside world were severed. Two days later, almost immediately after Ceauşescu had returned from a state visit to Iran, he went on national television to condemn the uprising, hypocritically referring to the demonstrators as "fascists." On the afternoon of December 21, he ordered the citizens of Bucharest to leave their homes and places of work to attend a televised rally at the Palace Square as a show of support for the communist government. Before a crowd of several hundred thousand, after a few minutes, Ceauşescu's speech could no longer be heard over the shouting of the angry mob. The television feed was soon interrupted, but it was not long before protestors assumed control of the cameras and resumed the broadcast so that the Romanian people could see the conflict that was unfolding on the streets of Bucharest. Their despotic ruler of twenty-four years, as well as his wife – who some say was even more despised than he – were forced to evacuate the scene by helicopter (Gross, 30-32).
By December 18, Timisoara's main post office was officially closed and all telephone links to the outside world were severed. Two days later, almost immediately after Ceauşescu had returned from a state visit to Iran, he went on national television to condemn the uprising, hypocritically referring to the demonstrators as "fascists." On the afternoon of December 21, he ordered the citizens of Bucharest to leave their homes and places of work to attend a televised rally at the Palace Square as a show of support for the communist government. Before a crowd of several hundred thousand, after a few minutes, Ceauşescu's speech could no longer be heard over the shouting of the angry mob. The television feed was soon interrupted, but it was not long before protestors assumed control of the cameras and resumed the broadcast so that the Romanian people could see the conflict that was unfolding on the streets of Bucharest. Their despotic ruler of twenty-four years, as well as his wife – who some say was even more despised than he – were forced to evacuate the scene by helicopter (Gross, 30-32).
Later that day, television and radio "journalists," still under state control, announced that Minister of Defense General Vasile Milea had committed suicide, even though it was widely suspected that Ceauşescu had had him executed for not following orders. This motivated the Romanian army to unite with the protestors in bringing down the national government. On December 22, as Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu attempted to escape from the city, protestors – now with the support of the army – took over Channel 1 in Bucharest and made the public acutely aware of the events that were transpiring within their borders. Petre Popescu, one of Romania's most-watched television news anchors, went on the air and announced that, "For 25 years we [at Romanian television] have lied." He then promised that, "From now on we will tell the truth," and "Whoever wishes can come to us and speak freely."
For the next couple of weeks, people lined up outside the studio for the opportunity to speak out against the government that had wronged them for all those years (Gross, 34-35). Meanwhile, the Ceauşescus were captured and held in custody until their two-hour trial in a kangaroo court on December 25, immediately after which they were executed. On December 27, supposed footage of their execution was broadcast on Romanian television, but independent forensics experts have concluded that their execution at the hands of the firing squad was faked, furthering suspicions that they were most likely victims of a coup that had been carried out under the cover of widespread revolution (Gross, 36). Nonetheless, one could argue that the people believed it simply because they needed to believe that the truth was actually capable of being televised, and they wanted to believe that justice had been served. Either way, in a matter of less than a week, Romanian television had moved from heavily censored, pro-state propaganda to the gruesome execution of their two most hated public figures.
For the next couple of weeks, people lined up outside the studio for the opportunity to speak out against the government that had wronged them for all those years (Gross, 34-35). Meanwhile, the Ceauşescus were captured and held in custody until their two-hour trial in a kangaroo court on December 25, immediately after which they were executed. On December 27, supposed footage of their execution was broadcast on Romanian television, but independent forensics experts have concluded that their execution at the hands of the firing squad was faked, furthering suspicions that they were most likely victims of a coup that had been carried out under the cover of widespread revolution (Gross, 36). Nonetheless, one could argue that the people believed it simply because they needed to believe that the truth was actually capable of being televised, and they wanted to believe that justice had been served. Either way, in a matter of less than a week, Romanian television had moved from heavily censored, pro-state propaganda to the gruesome execution of their two most hated public figures.
By all accounts, after the dramatic upheaval of the 1989 revolution, it seemed imminent that a new Romania would emerge from the constraints of communist oppression, but most scholars and political scientists seem to agree that there have been very few revolutionary ideas implemented in the past twenty years that would suggest that the central precepts of democracy have been realized. This is particularly true of Romanian mass media, which is still controlled by laws that were put into place by members of the former regime, many of whom even maintain positions of power in the current administration. Furthermore, we must also consider that before 1989, the general public had no frame of reference in regard to the media's potential to keep them informed about the events that shape their day-to-day existence. The historical precedents of Romanian "nonfiction" media offered merely a foundation of distrust that proved to be rather difficult to build any kind of credibility upon.
Twenty years later, Romania is now in the process of becoming a full member of the European Union, and according to the stipulations of this international agreement, there are certain human rights issues that must be addressed. Among these are freedom of expression in the media. In the 2008 Media Sustainability Index, the panel participants, which included several members of the Romanian independent media, claim that journalism in their country is still highly politicized and that corruption abounds within a framework that has instituted relatively few changes since the Ceauşescu regime. The National Council of Broadcasting (CNA) currently controls the issuance of broadcasting licenses in Romanian public media and its members are appointed by the President and the presiding Parliament. This has resulted in a blatant lack of political autonomy in determining who is granted such a license, as well as a troubling absence of professionalism within the profession.
Section 2, Chapter 2, Article 30 of the Romanian Constitution, which was ratified in 1991, mandates that:
- Freedom of expression, of thoughts, opinions, or beliefs, and freedom of any creation, by words, in writing, in pictures, by sounds or other means of public communication are inviolable,
- Any censorship shall be prohibited,
- Freedom of the press also involves the freedom to establish publications,
- No publications may be suppressed,
- The law may impose upon the mass media the obligation to make public their source of financing,
- Freedom of expression shall not be prejudicial to the dignity, honor, and privacy of a person, and the right to one's own image,
- Any defamation of the country and the nation, any instigation to a war of aggression, to national, racial, class or religious hatred, any incitement to discrimination, territorial separatism, or public violence, as well as any obscene conduct contrary to morality shall be prohibited by law,
- Civil liability for any information or creation made public falls upon the publisher or producer, the author, the producer of the artistic performance, the owner of the copying facilities, radio or television station, under the terms laid down by law. The law shall establish the indictable offenses of the press.
As we can see, there are some fundamental contradictions within this legal framework that undermine any notion of real journalistic freedom. Censorship is explicitly prohibited in the Romanian Constitution, but harsh fines and/or prison sentences may be imposed if anything negative is reported about a public official. In 2006, in an attempt to introduce some much needed reform to this system, a law was passed that eliminated prison terms for libel – but the Constitutional Court quickly reversed this decision, which now cannot be overruled. Without the freedom to voice dissenting opinions, one could certainly argue that true democracy cannot be achieved. As it stands, members of the domestic media can still be imprisoned or fined for criticizing the Romanian government, which also exerts a more direct form of control in the process of hiring, firing and promoting journalists on the basis of political affiliations. "Nepotism, friendship, political connections… or simply the whims of owners, editors and directors decides who is fired and promoted" (Coman and Gross, 111).
Furthermore, in Romania today, it is standard procedure for a newly hired journalist to be on probation for the first six to twelve months, during which time they may either not be paid or have a contractual labor agreement that stipulates that they are only paid per article published or story broadcast and can nonetheless be fired at any time without a specific reason. This reduces the professional autonomy of newly hired journalists and forces them to subscribe – at least superficially – to the ideologies of their superiors, many of whom, as I have suggested elsewhere, held these same positions of power in the Romanian media before the revolution took place.
These senior editors and producers also tend to be the only people on the staff that garner a wage capable of sustaining a comfortable lifestyle, and because of their connections (and loyalty) to members of the ruling government, many of them do not even pay income or taxes or standard operating fees (Coman and Gross, 112-113). With this in mind, the journalistic environment in Romania is much like the feudal system of the Middle Ages in that power and wealth are held by only a limited number of people, while reporters and other non-managerial staff are treated like serfs who are offered no choice but to comply with the political agendas of their employers.
Furthermore, in Romania today, it is standard procedure for a newly hired journalist to be on probation for the first six to twelve months, during which time they may either not be paid or have a contractual labor agreement that stipulates that they are only paid per article published or story broadcast and can nonetheless be fired at any time without a specific reason. This reduces the professional autonomy of newly hired journalists and forces them to subscribe – at least superficially – to the ideologies of their superiors, many of whom, as I have suggested elsewhere, held these same positions of power in the Romanian media before the revolution took place.
These senior editors and producers also tend to be the only people on the staff that garner a wage capable of sustaining a comfortable lifestyle, and because of their connections (and loyalty) to members of the ruling government, many of them do not even pay income or taxes or standard operating fees (Coman and Gross, 112-113). With this in mind, the journalistic environment in Romania is much like the feudal system of the Middle Ages in that power and wealth are held by only a limited number of people, while reporters and other non-managerial staff are treated like serfs who are offered no choice but to comply with the political agendas of their employers.
While the average journalist in Romania earns approximately the equivalent of $100 U.S. per month – which is low, even to Eastern European standards – if convicted of libel or slander, which can be ruled for something as seemingly insignificant as an insult to someone in a position of power, he or she can be fined anywhere from one million lei ($3,000 U.S.) to amounts that equal more than most Romanian journalists make in a lifetime. For example, in February of 2001, a cartoonist was severely fined, in addition to being fired, for depicting the mayor of his village as a pig (Reporters Without Borders, 2002). Journalists convicted of slander may also face a potential sentence of up to seven years in prison, or up to ten years if they are deemed to have revealed "state secrets." Luckily for the cartoonist, it was apparently not a state secret that the mayor of his village was commonly perceived to be a pig.
Recently, a law was even drafted that would allow people to sue for libel on behalf of the dead (Associated Press). According to the Romanian Media Monitoring agency, which is a private organization established to provide checks and balances on the existing media framework, in 2003, there were at least sixteen physical attacks on journalists, none of which led to arrests. One particular case even required that the victim spend fifty-five days in the hospital, but according to the Timisoara police inspector who was assigned to the case, it was "not sufficiently grave" enough to warrant any arrests (www.docstoc.com). So not only do Romanian journalists face the looming threat of severe fines and/or imprisonment, but they must also fear for their well-being in a system that has grown used to looking the other way when brutal acts of violence are committed against those who do not act in the interest of the ruling political party.
Recently, a law was even drafted that would allow people to sue for libel on behalf of the dead (Associated Press). According to the Romanian Media Monitoring agency, which is a private organization established to provide checks and balances on the existing media framework, in 2003, there were at least sixteen physical attacks on journalists, none of which led to arrests. One particular case even required that the victim spend fifty-five days in the hospital, but according to the Timisoara police inspector who was assigned to the case, it was "not sufficiently grave" enough to warrant any arrests (www.docstoc.com). So not only do Romanian journalists face the looming threat of severe fines and/or imprisonment, but they must also fear for their well-being in a system that has grown used to looking the other way when brutal acts of violence are committed against those who do not act in the interest of the ruling political party.
In regard to documentaries, independent filmmakers also face numerous logistical challenges in getting their films produced and distributed. For one thing, Romania only has 35 movie theaters that serve a population of approximately 22 million people. Although HBO has recently created a channel for Romanian programming and a few small film festivals have sprouted up throughout the country, the availability of potential financing so that a documentary might be produced remains a major concern. All funds, private and public, within Romania that can be used for film production are allocated by the state, based on anonymous proposals that must be submitted to a government committee called the CNC (National Film Center) for approval. While this anonymity can in fact be positive for beginning filmmakers who have not yet established a reputation, it also means that content is the primary criterion in determining whether or not a filmmaker receives financing for his or her project; and if the proposed content does not align with the political agenda of the Romanian government, it is unlikely that such a film could ever get produced or distributed without significant foreign investment (www.docstoc.com).
Meanwhile, in neighboring Moldova, on April 7, 2009, foreign news services reported that as many as thirty thousand students organized to protest the recent election in which the Communist Party maintained control of both the executive and legislative branches of government. In 2001, Moldova became the first former Soviet state to vote the Communist Party into office, and since that time, Moldova has held the distinction of being the poorest nation in Europe in terms of per capita income. The day after the most recent election results were announced, in the capital city of Chişinău, demonstrators shouted at the steps of the Parliament building. They were met with tear gas and jets of water, and the otherwise benign protest quickly turned violent. One person was killed and at least thirty were injured by police.
Representatives of the opposition party, the Liberal-Democrats, supported the students' claim that the election results were fraudulent, with ballot boxes bolstered by the names of deceased and non-existent voters. In response, President Vladimir Voronin, using familiar if not tired rhetoric by referring to the students as "fascists intoxicated with hatred," offered to conduct a recount (at the cost of approximately $1.5 million U.S.), but protestors are keenly aware that this fails to address the source of their contention. This dramatic societal conflict is reflective of the harsh ideological divide that defines the generation gap in both of these nations.
However, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this protest is the fact that it was organized on social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook (news.bbc.co.uk). In this instance, the Moldovan people, who share a common history and culture with Romanian nationals, by utilizing the modern technology that connects them, were able to circumvent the government censorship that limits the information that is made available to the public. With this in mind, the internet may yet be the key in arming the public with the information they need to unite and dissent in the name of democracy.
Representatives of the opposition party, the Liberal-Democrats, supported the students' claim that the election results were fraudulent, with ballot boxes bolstered by the names of deceased and non-existent voters. In response, President Vladimir Voronin, using familiar if not tired rhetoric by referring to the students as "fascists intoxicated with hatred," offered to conduct a recount (at the cost of approximately $1.5 million U.S.), but protestors are keenly aware that this fails to address the source of their contention. This dramatic societal conflict is reflective of the harsh ideological divide that defines the generation gap in both of these nations.
However, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this protest is the fact that it was organized on social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook (news.bbc.co.uk). In this instance, the Moldovan people, who share a common history and culture with Romanian nationals, by utilizing the modern technology that connects them, were able to circumvent the government censorship that limits the information that is made available to the public. With this in mind, the internet may yet be the key in arming the public with the information they need to unite and dissent in the name of democracy.
In addition to massive legislative reform, digital filmmaking may also be a solution to many of the issues that currently suppress nonfiction visual media in Romania. If we are to consider the limited expenses incurred when shooting on digital video as opposed to film, we can presuppose that an individual in possession of a camcorder, a computer and something to say can produce videos with the potential to reach a broader audience by means of the internet. This, in turn, may actually help promote the legislation necessary to reinvent Romanian media by lending a voice to a generation that is currently stifled by an oppressive tradition of corruption among those in power. The system as it is cannot sustain itself indefinitely.
Romania is a nation whose voting process is the primary means by which it bears the right to call itself a democracy, but without an outlet for dissenting opinions or the necessary information readily available to the voting public so that they can make intelligent decisions about who they elect to office, like so many facets of contemporary Romanian culture, its status as a democracy is supported in theory but not in practice. We must also consider that a revolution without the implementation of new ideas is merely an exercise in semantics.
For forty-two years, Romania was a fascist state with a communist economy, and today, they are a semi-fascist state with a capitalist economy. In looking at the broader scope of Romanian history, though, we can see that progress in this regard has been slow if not stagnant for much of the past two hundred years. Change, if it is to happen soon, will likely require that the generation who is only recently of voting age steps forward to assume control of their democracy, and in order for them to unite behind a common agenda, they must utilize whatever forms of media they have at their disposal. The Romanian people, I believe, must come to a common understanding that ignorance has no place in the information age.
Romania is a nation whose voting process is the primary means by which it bears the right to call itself a democracy, but without an outlet for dissenting opinions or the necessary information readily available to the voting public so that they can make intelligent decisions about who they elect to office, like so many facets of contemporary Romanian culture, its status as a democracy is supported in theory but not in practice. We must also consider that a revolution without the implementation of new ideas is merely an exercise in semantics.
For forty-two years, Romania was a fascist state with a communist economy, and today, they are a semi-fascist state with a capitalist economy. In looking at the broader scope of Romanian history, though, we can see that progress in this regard has been slow if not stagnant for much of the past two hundred years. Change, if it is to happen soon, will likely require that the generation who is only recently of voting age steps forward to assume control of their democracy, and in order for them to unite behind a common agenda, they must utilize whatever forms of media they have at their disposal. The Romanian people, I believe, must come to a common understanding that ignorance has no place in the information age.
Works Cited
Associated Press. "Romania Plans to Let People Sue for Libel on Behalf of the Dead." GMA News. 18 Mar. 2009. GMA New Media, Inc. 25 Apr. 2009.
"Attacks on the Press 2002: Romania - Committee to Protect Journalists." Press Freedom Online - Committee to Protect Journalists. 31 Mar. 2003. 25 Apr. 2009 <http://cpj.org/2003/03/attacks-on-the-press-2002-romania.php>.
"BBC NEWS | Europe | Moldova students raid parliament." BBC NEWS | News Front Page. 7 Apr. 2009. 25 Apr. 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7987608.stm>.
Berry, David. The Romanian Mass Media and Cultural Development. Grand Rapids: Ashgate, Limited, 2004.
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